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Tenant's Rights in Pennsylvania: Has the
Middle Class Tenant Been Forgotten?
INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, a trend toward increasing tenants' rights
has been established throughout the United States. Many legal com-
mentators have strived to alert the judiciary, legislature, and general
public to the inequitable practices in present landlord-tenant relation-
ships, especially with respect to the indigent tenant.' In Pennsylvania,
the effectiveness of this effort is demonstrated by the Rent Withholding
Act,2 passed in 1965 and subsequently held constitutional.3 This act
gives tenants the right to withhold rent from the landlord if a leased
dwelling is unfit for human habitation. The primary objective of the
act is to insure all tenants, regardless of social or economic class, habit-
able living quarters free from rats, vermin, and disease.
The purpose of this comment is to explore landlord-tenant law with
respect to leased dwellings which are fit for human habitation and
therefore fall outside of the scope of the Rent Withholding Act. The
comment will be directed toward the problems encountered by the
tenant whose dwelling may need repair, but is still fit for habitation.
For convenience, the tenants in this category will be referred to as
"middle class tenants," although it is recognized that some may be in
a higher or lower economic class.
SCOPE OF THE MIDDLE CLASS TENANT'S PROBLEMS
In the United States over seventy million people, approximately
forty percent of the population,4 rent their dwellings. The percentage
of leased dwellings in large urban areas is much higher, and increasing
yearly. This annual increase is due in great part to the mobility of this
nation. Fewer people remain at one residence during their entire
lives. White collar workers expect to relocate several times during their
1. For an extended bibliography of contributions to the tenants' rights movement,
see Indritz, The Tenants' Rights Movement, 1 N.M.L. REv. 1, 127 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Indritz].
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 1700-09 (Supp. 1970).
3. Depaul v. Kaufman, 441 Pa. 386, 272 A.2d 500 (1971).
4. Indritz, supra note 1, at 1.
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careers. Tradesmen, skilled laborers, and other blue collar workers are
shifted to new work sites frequently. The responsibility and perma-
nence associated with owning a home is outweighed by the convenience
and enhanced mobility associated with renting an apartment. It is
foreseeable that urban areas and large parts of suburban areas will be
virtually all leased units in the near future. Furthermore, the Ameri-
can society's mores have changed in the last generation- owning one's
own house and land is not considered indispensable for raising a family.
While the number of people renting their dwellings is increasing
annually in Pennsylvania, landlord and tenant common law remains
steeped in outworn property concepts suited only for a small agrarian
society.5 The tenant whose apartment falls outside of the Rent With-
holding Act, therefore, has few ways of compelling the landlord to
repair any defective or dangerous conditions. Minor defects commonly
found in urban apartments such as malfunctioning appliances,
shredded carpets, leaking plumbing, and buckling wallpaper may not
be repaired by the landlord for months, if at all. It may be that only
after the lease is signed and he has moved in, that a tenant will notice
the weak construction of his apartment and the deteriorating main-
tenance of the building and grounds. In a short time, a newly married
couple can become disillusioned with the $250 per month "luxury
hi-rise" which has a broken dishwasher, paper thin walls, inadequate
air conditioning, and the likelihood of a rent increase for the next
lease term. If the tenants attempt to withhold rent until any defective
conditions are repaired, they may be evicted without judicial hearing
and have a judgment entered against them for the total amount of the
rent due during the entire lease term.
With few exceptions, the legal relationship between the landlord
and the middle class tenant is based on the standard form residential
lease.6 Some of the provisions include: (1) a confession of judgment
clause for any unpaid rent, (2) a provision for distraint, (3) a 'waiver of
the tenants' rights under the Landlord-Tenant Act of 1951,7 (4) a
5. The judicial updating of landlord-tenant law is inhibited by the paucity of cases
which reach the appellate courts. The relatively 'small amounts involved in landlord-
tenant disputes, the tenant's fear of reprisal by the landlord and the reluctance of a
tenant to become involved in litigation discourage the filing of law sUits or appeals from
adverse decisions.
6. Standard "Naly Form No. 40 Lease," available from P.O. Naly Co., Pittsburgh, Pa.
In Allegheny County about 90 per cent of all tenants have signed this lease. See Indritz,
supra note 1, at 10.
7. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 250.101-.397 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as the Act].
Duquesne Law Review
clause accelerating the rent due for the entire lease term if a default
in a rent payment occurs, (5) a provision for the charging the tenant
with costs and attorneys fees associated with recovering any rent due,
(6) an exculpatory clause releasing the landlord from tort liability to
third persons for defective conditions on the premises, (7) a clause
requiring a deposit applicable to any damage done by the tenant, (8) a
clause forbidding subletting without the consent of the landlord, (9) a
clause forfeiting the security deposit as liquidated damages if sub-
letting is requested by the tenant and permitted by landlord, (10) a
waiver of notice to surrender possession of the premises, and (11) a
clause permitting the landlord to evict the tenant upon a default in
rent payments without a judicial hearing. These provisions are rarely
modified for an individual tenant either because of the tenant's failure
to understand the provisions and seek any modifications, or because
of the landlord's refusal to change the lease. Since the urban housing
market runs in favor of the landlord, and most landlords use a written
lease, a tenant has little choice but to sign the lease to obtain suitable
living quarters within a reasonable time. The discussion of the rights
of the landlord and middle class tenant will be based on the provisions
found in this lease. Hopefully, in the near future, the courts will recog-
nize the standard form lease only as. a point of departure and seek
solutions to landlord-tenant problems by applying more equitable prin-
ciples. Specifically, the courts could declare confession of judgment
clauses in standard form residential leases invalid for all economic
classes. Also, to compliment the Rent Withholding Act, the courts by
analogy to the Uniform Commercial Code's implied warranty of mer-
chantability" could establish an implied warranty of habitability. 9
With flexible standards for determining breach under this warranty, a
landlord may be responsible for repairing defects in an apartment
which falls short of rendering the apartment unfit for human habita-
tion as required by the Rent Withholding Act.
LANDLORD'S RIGHTS
The primary interest of the landlord is in the income from the leased
dwelling. Several of the detailed provisions in the lease protect this
8. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314.
9. See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v.
Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 50 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d
526 (1970).
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interest. Common remedies for a tenant's default in rent established
by the lease and recognized in Pennsylvania courts include: (1) con-
fession of judgment, (2) distraint, and (3) eviction.
1. Confession of Judgment
A confession of judgment may be defined as:
A power to affect the legal relations of another, created in the
form of an agency authority, but held for the benefit of the power
holder or a third person and given to secure the performance of a
duty or to protect a title, either legal or equitable, such power
being given when the duty or title is created or given for con-
sideration.10
A warrant of attorney to confess judgment creates in the landlord
an agency coupled with an interest. The tenant, therefore, cannot re-
voke the warrant of attorney as he could a mere agency agreement.
The landlord has a security interest he can enforce in his own right.1
After conveying a security interest to the landlord, a tenant cannot
revoke the landlord's power of attorney to confess judgments without
denying the landlord his rights. Only satisfaction of the debt, expira-
tion of the lease, or death of the tenant will terminate this power. 12
Confessions of judgments in the United States may be classified into
three different categories: void, limited, and allowed. Twenty jurisdic-
tions declare confessions of judgment to be void.13 Of these jurisdic-
tions, three declare the use of a confession of judgment clause to be a
crime.' 4 Seventeen jurisdictions allow them only under limited cir-
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 138 (1957). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has described this procedure in Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 3, 97 A.2d 234, 236
(1953):
A warranty of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most powerful and drastic
document known to civil law. The signer deprives himself of every defense and delay
to execution, he waives exception of personal property from levy and sale under ex-
emption laws, and he places his cause in the hands of a hostile defender.
11. See Mellon v. Ritz, 332 Pa. 97,2 A.2d 699 (1938).
12. Stucker v. Shumaker, 290 Pa., 348, 139 A. 114 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 139 (1957).
13. ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16 (1958); CAL. COMM. CODE § 1804.1 (West 1964); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-16-6 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 42-88 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 55.05
(1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-2904 (1968); LA. REv. STAT. 6:585 (Supp. 1971); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 83, § 130(b) (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 255B, § 20 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT.
§ 56.12 (1969); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 13-811 (1947); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 361-A:
7VIII-I (1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16(C)-37 (1970); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-16 (1953);
N.Y. PEa. PROP. LAW § 403(3)(c) (McKinney 1962); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-13-02 (13)
(1960); ORE. REv. STAT. § 83.670(l) (1969); S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-800.13 (1970); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 25-201 (1955); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. art. 2224 (1964).
14. IND. ANN STAT. § 2-2906 (1968); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-9-18 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 83.990 (1) (1969).
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cumstances.15 Of the ten jurisdictions which allow confessions of judg-
ment, 6 they are widely used in only Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
leases.
The right to confess judgment vests upon a default in rent payments
or a breach in a lease covenant. The landlord by the terms of the
standard form lease will be empowered to confess judgment for an
amount equal to the total rent due for the remainder of the lease
period and "the costs and attorney's fees associated with this action. The
confession of judgment further extends to an action of ejectment
against the tenant. Whether the landlord can employ these remedies
cumulatively will be further discussed in a later section.
The Pennsylvania courts have tended to construe confession of judg-
ment clauses in leases strictly, attempting to alleviate their harshness. 17
Underlying these decisions, however, is the assumption by the court
that if the language is clear and conspicuous, Pennsylvania will up-
hold confession of judgment clauses. A landlord, therefore, need only
fulfill these two requirements to have an enforceable clause. This rea-
soning was considered valid until the recent case of Swarb v. Lennox.'8
In Swarb, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held Pennsylvania's confession of judgment practice un-
constitutional for a limited class of debtors. The decision was based
on the theory that low income debtors on a lease or an installment con-
tract, although having sufficient notice of the confession of judgment
clause, do not understand its effects. More specifically, the fact that
15. ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.050 (1962); ARIM. REV. STAT. ANN. 22-219 (1956); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 29-301 (1962); GA. CODE ANN. § 110-601 (1935); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 633-3 (1968);
IDAHO CODE §§ 10-901, 904 (1948); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.090 (1969); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 27A.2906 (1962); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1551 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 511.070-.080 (1949);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-907 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 689 (1961); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 19-25-24 (1968); S.D. CODE § 37:0301 (Supp. 1960); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2139
(1958); VA. CODE § 8-355 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4.60.010-.070 (1956). These
limited circumstances may vary from state to state. Some limitations are: monetary
limitation of amount confessed, allowing confession in only certain types of contracts,
requiring that the defendant personally appear before the clerk of courts in order to
confess judgment, requiring that confezsions of judgments arc only valid if made under
oath, or restricting their use in only cases of default.
16. Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953); American Bowling Club v.
Kanefsky, 370 Pa. 136, 87 A.2d 646 (1952). DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 2306 (1953); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, § 50(3) (Smith-Hurd 1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3084 (1964); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 17-090 (1957); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2323.12-.13 (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (Supp. 1971); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-3 (1953); W.VA. CODE ANN. §
56-4-48 (1966); WIs. STAT. § 270.69 (1969); Wvo. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-309 to -312 (1957).
17. E.g., Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956); Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw,
'74 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953); American Bowling Club v. Kanefsky 370 Pa. 136, 87 A.2d
646 (1952); Gratz Bros. v. Margolis, 186 Pa. Super. 268, 142 A.2d 375 (1958).
18. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd in part, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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the debtors did not know or understand that they were waiving their
rights to notice prior to judgment was a violation of due process. 19 The
court limited its holding to judgment clauses in leases and consumer
financing transactions for individuals having incomes less than $10,000.20
The Swarb court drew the line at $10,000 since all but one plaintiff in
the class action had an income below this figure, and the interest of
the class of persons having incomes above $10,000 would not be ade-
quately protected in this action. 21 The United States Supreme Court
later affirmed the part of the decision holding that it was not uncon-
stitutional to enforce the confession of judgment against those earning
over $10,000.22 No appeal was taken regarding those earning less than
$10,000.23
The unfairness of the landlord's power to confess judgment lies in
the denial of the right to a judicial hearing before entry of judgment
against the tenant. In order to defend against a confessed judgment, a
tenant must move to strike or move to open judgment.24 The burden
is now on the tenant to show invalidity of the judgment. Faced with
this burden, and the costs associated with moving to strike or open a
judgment, most tenants do not challenge the confessed judgment. In
Swarb, neither the district court nor the United States Supreme Court
found the confession of judgment procedure violative of due process
per se, the district court's decision being based on the lack of an intelli-
gent waiver of the tenant's right to a judicial hearing prior to judg-
ment. It is submitted that a holding based on the lack of an intelligent
waiver provides the tenant with little protection against confessions of
judgment. In the landlord-tenant situation, the present housing short-
age pressures the tenant into signing a lease. Even if the landlord ex-
plained to a prospective tenant the legal effects of the various one-sided
clauses in the standard form lease, the tenant would still have little
choice but to sign the lease. A holding based on lack of intelligent
waiver ignores the tenant's lack of bargaining power which has allowed
19. 314 F. Supp. at 1098. See Comment, Assignment and Negotiation: A Violation ol
Due Process, 10 DuQ. L. REV. 92 (1971).
20. 314 F. Supp. at 1101.
21. Id. at 1099. The court recognized that credit may be harder to secure by those
affected by this decision.
22. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
23. Regarding those earning less than $10,000, the court stated:
This affirmance does not mean that the District Court's opinion and judgment are
approved as to the aspects and details not before us.
Id. at 201.
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 911 (Supp. 1971).
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landlords to unilaterally determine the conditions in a lease. It is sub-
mitted that an intelligent waiver cannot exist in a situation where
there is a disparity in bargaining power between the two parties, re-
gardless of one party's education, annual income, or resources. Limiting
the effect of the decision to tenants with annual incomes less than
$10,000, as did the Swarb Court, works an injustice to tenants of other
economic classes. 25 The fundamental right of a tenant to a judicial
hearing before entry of an adverse judgment should not depend on
income.
The United States Supreme Court and the district court in Swarb
were reluctant to hold confession of judgment clauses per se violative
of fourteenth amendment due process. 26 Yet, the courts have recognized
the hardship which may result in these clauses. As stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.:27
When the facts indicate that the contract is one of adhesion, when
there is great disparity in bargaining power, or where the debtor
receives nothing for the cognovit provision, other legal conse-
quences may ensue.28
It is submitted that substantially all confession of judgment clauses
in leases are signed under exactly the above conditions. The courts,
refused to take the only step which would effectively eliminate
the inequity caused by the confession of judgment clause. Perhaps
the reluctance of the judiciary to invalidate all confessions of judg-
ment clauses can be traced to the attitude expressed by Justice Black-
mun in Swarb, "Problems of this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist
for the legislative mill."29 Until the grinding stones of this mill begin
to turn, Pennsylvania tenants are left without adequate protection
against a properly drafted confession of judgment clause in a lease.
2. Distraint
Distraint, commonly known as a "levy" or "seizure", may be defined
as the right of the landlord to take and hold the tenant's chattels when-
25. See 75 DICK. L. REV. 169 (1970) (argument that the Swarb decision violates equal
protection).
26. The United States Supreme Court refused to find a per se violation of due process
even after Pennsylvania's Attorney General, who was aligned with the respondents in the
trial court, switched sides on appeal, admitting that the confession of judgment pro-
cedures were per se violative of due process and contrary to Pennsylvania's public policy.
27. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
28. Id. at 188.
29. Id. at 202.
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ever the rent payments are in arrears.30 The Landlord and Tenant Act
of 1951 (Act) codifies the common law right of the landlord to dis-
train, and further gives the landlord the right to sell the distrained
goods. The Act authorizes the taking and sale of the tenant's property
without requiring any judicial determination of the validity of the
landlord's claim for rent.31 The form lease invariably contains a dis-
traint clause.
Since the landlord need not notify the tenant prior to distraint, the
remedy is a drastic one. A tenant who has been late on a rent payment
for whatever reason, may return to his apartment in the evening to
find the television, stereo, or cooking utensils missing.
In Gross v. Fox, 32 a three judge federal court held that the levy pur-
suant to the Act violated the fourteenth amendment due process re-
quirement. 3 Gross is one case of many recent federal court decisions
which have condemned various state summary procedures as violative
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 4 The question
of the validity of a distraint provision in a lease, though, may be
still open.
In Sellers v. Contino,35 a case decided before Gross, the court held
that a presumption that poor tenants understandingly and knowingly
waive their constitutional rights to notice and hearing could not arise
from the signing of a lease containing a clause consenting to distraint
sales.3 6 The court refused to characterize the lease as an adhesion con-
tract since no evidence as to the similarity of other leases in the area
was introduced. 7 The holding in Sellers was limited to poor tenants
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 561 (4th ed. 1951).
31. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 68, § 250.306 (1965). Most jurisdictions have recognized the
harshness of these procedures and have abolished or restricted the common law remedy
of distraint. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, in N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 33-1 (1970), and Delaware
in 25 DEL. CODE ANN. § 5501 (1953), are the only states in which distraint is totally
extra-judicial.
32. 349 F. Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
33. Id. at 1165.
34. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Laprese v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F.
Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Klum v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970). These deci-
sions flow from the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969). Sniadach involved the constitutionality of a pre-judgment garnishment statute
which permitted a creditor to freeze a portion of a wage earner's salary pending the out-
come on the merits of the underlying action on the debt. If the claim proved invalid, the
wage earner would be given all the frozen wages. The Court held that the temporary re-
striction of the wage earner's use of the frozen money without a prior hearing or notice
deprived the wage earner of due process of law. Id. at 342.
35. 327 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
36. Id. at 234.
37. Id. The court also refused to find an unreasonable search and seizure which would
have invalidated the distraint procedures for all tenants regardless of economic class.
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in a manner similar to that in Swarb. "Poor" tenants are those classi-
fied as poor under guidelines published by the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) for urban areas.38
Given the decision in Gross that Pennsylvania's distraint procedure
as codified in the Act is unconstitutional per se, it is submitted that a
distraint provision in a lease should not be enforced against any tenant.
Conceding that low income tenants are particularly susceptible to un-
fair landlord practices such as distraint, the circumstances surrounding
the signing of a residential lease are substantially the same for all
tenants. The landlord is in a superior bargaining position even when
a tenant with a relatively high income is seeking an apartment. The
widespread use of the form lease forces a tenant to accept its provisions.
An intelligent waiver of a constitutional right cannot be made in this
coercive situation by any tenant regardless of economic class.
3. Eviction
Under the standard form lease, a landlord has the right to confess
judgment in an action of ejectment against the tenant if the rent pay-
ments are in arrears. After obtaining the judgment, the landlord may
eject the tenant from the premises. Pennsylvania follows the English
rule allowing the landlord to expel by the use of reasonable force a
tenant who has no right to remain in possession of the premises.3 9 A
thirty day notice of ejectment, required by the Act,40 is waived under
the standard form lease. The validity of the tenant's reason for default-
ing on the rent will not be judicially reviewed unless he seeks to open
the judgment. In the interim, the tenant is without a place to live for
an indefinite period.
Waiver of the statutory notice to quit, i.e., surrender possession of
the premises, under the Act is a particularly harsh lease provision. The
Act, however, specifically recognizes that "the notice above provided
...may be waived by the tenant if the lease so provides."41 Since a
waiver clause is present in all standard form leases, the statutory notice
provisions is inapplicable to dwellings rented under a standard form
lease.
38. Revised OEO Income Poverty Guidelines, OEO Instruction 6004-1(b) (December 1,
1970). The standard is $1900 for one person with a $600 increase for each additional
family member.
39. Overdeer v. Lewis, I W. & S. 90 (Pa. 1841).
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.501 (1965).
41. Id.
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In Fontana v. Miller,42 the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County upheld a provision in a residential lease which waived all
benefits of the Act. The tenant argued that the waiver was an ad-
hesion contract and against public policy. The court quickly dismissed
these arguments recognizing that the Act expressly permits a waiver of
notice, and finding no unfairness in the waiver.43 The waiver would be
invalid only if fraud, mistake, or accident were proven by the tenant.44
Notice to quit at the end of a lease term is also waived under a
standard form lease even if the tenant has not broken any covenants
and paid the rent in full. The landlord, although he may be ethically
bound to give notice to quit a reasonable time before the expiration
of the lease term, is under no legal obligation to do so. Many land-
lords as a retaliatory measure, may not give notice to tenants who have
been "troublesome." At the end of the lease term, the landlord can
legally refuse to renew the lease. An unsuspecting tenant may be
turned out of the premises on the last day of the lease term with no
place to relocate. "Troublesome" tenants often are those who have
tried to enforce or extend their rights vis-A-vis the landlord.
Allowing a waiver of the thirty day notice to quit provided in the
Act effectively renders that section of the Act a nullity. Given the ex-
press language of the statute permitting waiver, a court must resort to
adhesion contract principles to invalidate the waiver in form leases, a
course of action which has not met acceptance in Pennsylvania land-
lord-tenant law. The most effective change would come from the legis-
lature. Eliminating the language which permits waiver of notice to quit
could be the first step in a legislative updating of the Act.
SECURITY DEPOSITS
Almost all urban landlords require a security deposit from the
tenant. This deposit, usually one month's rent, will be applied to any
damage done by the tenant to the leased premises during the lease
term. Normal wear and tear of the dwelling is excepted. Since tenants
are familiar with this provision of the lease, the security deposit is the
subject of much controversy among tenants, and can greatly affect the
tenant's actions during the lease term. Aside from benefitting the land-
42. 116 Pitt. L.J. 422 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. 1968).
43. Id. at 424.
44. Id.
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lord, the requirement of a security deposit does serve a useful function
by giving the tenant an incentive to treat the dwelling as his own. A
tenant will tend to be more careful in using his apartment if he real-
izes that any damage to the apartment will come from a fund which
he has already surrendered to the landlord. Also, since the landlord
knows he will be reimbursed for damages done to his units by the
tenant, presumably lie can charge a lower monthly rent per apartment.
Many landlords, however, abuse this device either by refusing to
return the money at the end of the lease term or by inflating the cost
of repairing any damage that has been done by the tenant. Since most
tenants believe that the amount involved is small relative to the ex-
pense and trouble of initiating legal action, and few are familiar with
the procedure for asserting their legal rights, the landlord's refusal
to return a deposit is seldom challenged. Unjustified retention of
security deposits is especially high in areas which have a high turnover
rate for each lease period such as communities surrounding an urban
university. College students, because of their lack of economic power,
are frequently victims of this practice.45
The Act was amended in 1968 to include a specific provision which
deals with security deposits. 46 A tenant who wishes to recover his
security deposit initiates the procedure by giving the landlord written
notice of his new address at the expiration of the lease term.47 The
landlord, within thirty days, must return deposit less any deductions
for damage. 48 The deductions, if any, must be itemized and specified
in detail.49 Failure by the landlord to respond within thirty days gives
the tenant a cause of action in assumpsit for double the amount of the
security deposit. 0 The provisions of this section of the Act are not
subject to waiver.51
45. See Indritz, supra note 1, at 23.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit 68, § 250.512 (1965).
47. Id. Under the written form lease, the security deposit is separated from the monthly
xental payments and is not to be applied to any month's rent. A tenant, therefore, cannot
refuse to pay the last month's rent under the theory that the security deposit retained by
the lessor should be applied to the debt.
48. Id. The landlord cannot deduct for unpaid rent. See Al-Bassam v. Kramer, 119
Pitt. L.J. 50 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. Co. 1971). An Allegheny County trial court held that the
landlord could not set off unpaid rent against the tenant's demand for return of the
security deposit. The court based its decision on the separate function of the security
deposit.
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.512 (1965).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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CUMULATION OF REMEDIES
The standard form lease contains provisions for the termination of
the leasehold and acceleration of the rent due for the entire lease
period upon default of a rent payment by the tenant. The lease further
provides that recovery of possession of the premises does not deprive
the landlord of future rent as it would become due. Without the latter
provision, the landlord could not eject a tenant and recover rent for
the remainder of the term. 2 Several older cases, however, contain
dicta which concede that specific language will effect a cumulation of
remedies.53 Courts, however, are generally opposed to the harshness of
cumulative remedies which tend to unjustly enrich the landlord. 54 It is
unlikely that a court would allow a landlord to eject the tenant and
also to collect the full term rental. 55
It is submitted that the amount due through acceleration of rent is
so out of proportion to the actual damage suffered by a landlord, a
court should hold that the clause is an invalid attempt to liquidate
damages or a penalty clause. Once construed as a liquidated damage
clause, the clause should be declared void since the damages called for
do not reasonably relate to the actual damage suffered-a judicially
recognized rationale for invalidating a liquidated damage clause. 56 In
this case, the function of the clause is to penalize the tenant for a
breach, and is, therefore, unenforceable. It is further submitted that
the landlord's duty to mitigate damages 57 should preclude an accelera-
tion of rent. Allowing recovery for several months on a residential
lease would be inconsistent with the landlord's duty to mitigate. Any
recovery should be limited to the actual amount of damage proved by
the landlord.
TENANT'S DEFENSES
A tenant's default in rent payments can be attributed to one of the
following reasons: (1) lack of enough money to meet the rent payment,
52. Matovich v. Gradich, 123 Pa. Super. 355, 187 A. 65 (1936); DeLong Hook & Eye Co.
v. Vogue Silk Hosiery Co., 108 Pa. Super. 369, 164 A. 848 (1933).
53. Purvis v. Dempsey, 238 Pa. 173, 85 A. 1091 (1913); Markeim-Chalmers-Ludington,
Inc. v. Mead, 140 Pa. Super. 490, 14 A.2d 152 (1940); Grakelow v. Kidder, 95 Pa. Super.
250 (1928).
54. Greco v. Woodlawn Furniture Co., 99 Pa. Super. 290, 292, (1930); Grakelow v.
Kidder, 95 Pa. Super. 250, 256 (1928).
55. See Comment, The Form 50 Lease: Judicial Treatment of an Adhesion Contract,
111 U. PA. L. REV. 1197, 1211 (1963).
56. Kelso v. Reid, 145 Pa. 606, 23 A. 323 (1891).
57. Vega v. Burgettstown Borough, 394 Pa. 406, 147 A.2d 620 (1959); Wilkinson v.
Colley, 164 Pa. 35, 30 A. 286 (1894).
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(2) unjustified refusal to pay rent, (3) forgetting to make the payment
either accidently or carelessly, and (4) purposely withholding the rent
payment because of a grievance concerning the leased premises. In the
first two situations the tenant has no colorable defense to assert against
the landlord's claim.58 The third situation usually results in the tenant
paying the rent after notice by the landlord although the landlord need
not give notice before resorting to his remedies. 59 An additional sum
may be required by the lease if the payment is late. The fourth situa-
tion is the most important from a tenant's rights point of view. The
tenant may have a legitimate complaint regarding the condition of the
premises, the maintenance of the apartment building, or any malfunc-
tioning appliances. These grievances may relate to two types of con-
ditions: first, conditions which require major repairs and render the
dwelling unfit for human habitation; second, conditions which require
repair but do not render the dwelling unfit for human habitation. The
former category of grievances is within the scope of the Rent With-
holding Act. Under this statute, the tenant will pay rent into escrow
until the landlord repairs the defective condition and the dwelling is
once again fit to habitate. The second category of grievance which
occurs far more frequently in the case of middle class tenants is not
covered under the Rent Withholding Act, and therefore, Pennsylvania's
common law governs this situation.
LANDLORD'S DU-TY TO REPAIR IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania follows the common law rule that a landlord has no
duty to keep the leased premises in repair unless he expressly cove-
nants to do so. 60 The tenant has the duty to make all repairs to the
premises. 61 Further, even if a landlord expressly agrees to make repairs
upon the premises, a lessee will not be relieved of his duty to pay rent
if the landlord fails to make the repairs.62 The tenant's duty to pay
rent is independent of all the landlord's obligations except the obliga-'
tion not to interfere with the tenant's peaceful possession of the prem-
ises. 63 Even if the landlord orally promises that no rent is due until cer-
58. But cf. Weil v. Chandler, 38 Misc. 2d 58, 239 N.Y.S.2d 514 (Sup. Ct. 1962). The
New York Court permitted a stay in rent solely because of hardship.
59. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 250.302 (1965).
60. Solomon v. Neisner Bros., 187 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1950); Lopez v. Gukenvack, 391
Pa. 359, 137 A.2d 771 (1958); Smith v. Kravitz, 173 Pa. Super. 11, 93 A.2d 889 (1953).
61. Huber v. Baum, 152 Pa. 626, 26 A. 101 (1893).
62. Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 158, 6 Am. Dec. 439 (Pa. 1813).
63. Berger v. Mimms, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 608 (C.P. Phila. Co. 1968).
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tain repairs are completed, the tenants duty to pay rent is still independ-
ent of the landlord's agreement to repair.64
The policy of placing the responsibility for repairing any defective
conditions on the tenant has its origin in post-feudal times. In a small,
agrarian society, the rule was sound policy. The tenant's main interest
was in the land and its use. Any buildings erected thereon were of a
secondary importance. Further, since the tenant usually was just as
capable of making repairs to the buildings as the landlord, the courts
placed no duty to repair upon the landlord absent a specific agreement.
A lease was considered a conveyance in land and not a contract; the
form of the transaction was properly adapted to its purpose.
Modern landlord-tenant law in Pennsylvania still views the lease as
a conveyance of an interest in land and not as a contract. This view is
inconsistent with the modern lease and its function.65 In large urban
areas, the lease is essentially a contract for living space and associated
services such as heat, water, and electricity. An urban tenant rarely has
much interest in the land. His concerns is in the particular parcel of
space he occupies on that land.
The effect of refusing to conceptually view a lease as a contract is
two-fold: (1) the respective covenants of each party are independent-
breach of a covenant by one party does not suspend the duty of the other
party to comply with other covenants, and (2) the rights and liabilities
of the parties are completely embodied in the lease and implied war-
ranties which accompany most contracts are precluded from applying
to leases. The present status of the law in Pennsylvania, therefore, is
that a tenant cannot assert a defense to a landlord's claim for unpaid
rent based upon defective conditions of the leased dwelling unless the
dwelling is rendered unfit for human habitation under the Rent With-
holding Act.68
TRENDS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Landlord-tenant relationships have been evolving throughout the
United States in the last decade. The approach to a lease as a convey-
ance of land has been giving way to an approach which views the lease
64. Bradley v. Citizens Trust & Sur. Co., 7 Pa. Super. 419 (1898).
65. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
66. Reeves v. McComesky, 168 Pa. 571, 32 A. 96 (1895); Osso v. Rohanna, 187 Pa. Super.
280, 144 A.2d 862 (1958).
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as a contract with mutual and dependent covenants.6 7 Recently devel-
oped judicial doctrines which work in the tenant's favor by relieving
him of the duty to continue paying rent while his dwelling is in a state
of disrepair include constructive eviction,68 illegal leases,69 and an im-
plied warranty of habitability. 70 Also, courts in the future may invali-
date onerous provisions in a lease such as waiver of notice to quit on an
adhesion contract theory.7' These new tenant defenses are not without
weaknesses and shortcomings, and the scope of application at present
is still not clearly defined. Perhaps the most flexible remedy is the im;
plied warranty of habitability. As stated in Lemle v. Breeden7 2 the im-
plied warranty of habitability theory allows the courts to apply a "con-
sistent and responsive set of remedies," for the benefit of a tenant.
In Lemle, the court held that a tenant who signed a lease devoid of
express warranties could rescind the lease because the premises were
uninhabitable even though the tenant did inspect the premises before
signing the lease. Although the facts might have established a construc-
tive eviction,73 the court based its decision on an implied warranty
ground. The implied warranty was found by application of an analogy
to the sales law concepts. The court focused on the expectations of the
tenant after signing the lease. A tenant in renting an apartment, accord-
ing to the court, is "implicitly or expressly bargaining for immediate
possession of the premises in a suitable condition. '74 Since a lease can
be considered a sale, and sales law protects the purchaser through im-
plied warranties, 75 the court reasoned that an implied warranty should
also apply to leases.76
One of the problems with the implied warranty of habitability theory
is that of defining the standards to be used in determining if a breach
has occurred. The standards have been on sales law analogies and hous-
ing code regulations. In Javins v. First National Realty Corp.,77 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found a continuing im-
67. See Indritz, supra note 1, at 67.
68. Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 340 Mass. 124, 163 N.E.2d 4 (1959).
69. Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
70. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Lemle v. Breeden,
51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini v. Ireland, 50 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
71. See Indritz, supra note 1, at 107.
72. 51 Hawaii 426, 432, 462 P.2d 470, 475 (1969).
73. See Comment, Tenant Remedies-The Implied Warranty of Fitness and Habit-
ability, 16 ViLL. L. REv. 710, 718 (1971).
74. 51 Hawaii at 430; 462 P.2d at 473.
75. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315.
76. 51 Hawaii at 431, 462 P.2d at 474.
77. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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plied warranty of habitability in favor of a tenant when it applied
housing code standards as a measure for determining breach of this
warranty. This standard is more definite than that used in Lemle. In
Lemle, the court stated that each case must turn on its facts. Serious-
ness of the claimed defect and length of time for which it persists are
factors to be weighed by the court in determining if a breach has
occurred.78 In Marini v. Ireland,79 New Jersey adopted an implied war-
ranty of habitability for residential dwellings. The Marini court, in
attempting to mark the limits of the landlord's obligation stated that:
The nature of the vital facilities and type of maintenance and
repairs required is limited and governed by the type of property
rented and the amount of rent reserved.80
The standard adopted in Marini is more flexible than that used in
Javins or Lemle, and may afford protection to tenants whose dwellings
are well above the minimum standard of habitability. The court may
have recognized that a standard based on violation of housing code
regulations would not do justice in many situations.81 It is submitted
that an implied warranty, if based on a tenant's reasonable expecta-
tions, should take into account factors such as the amount of monthly
rental payments. A landlord of a "luxury" apartment building, there-
fore, could not allow various appliances such as air conditioners, dish-
washers, and garbage disposals to fall into disrepair maintaining that
no breach of warranty occurred since the premises still meet a mini-
mum standard of habitability. The tenants are paying increased rent
for these additional services and reasonably expect that any malfunc-
tion will be promptly repaired.
In Pennsylvania, even if it is assumed that the courts adopted the
implied warranty of habitability theory, the remedy would be of little
practical value to tenants without a standard which varied according
to the type of dwelling and rent paid by the tenant. The Rent With-
holding Act is already available to tenants whose housing falls below
minimum livable standards. It is the better situated tenant who would
benefit from the adoption of this tenant defense in Pennsylvania. The
defense, would not be meaningless to low income tenants. The war-
ranty would subject all landlords to a stricter standard, forcing them to
keep all buildings in a reasonable state of repair.
78. 51 Hawaii at 433, 462 P.2d at 476.
79. 50 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970).
80. Id. at 144-45, 265 A.2d at 534.
81. See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. App. 1968).
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IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IN PENNSYLVANIA
Pennsylvania courts have held that the landlord may expressly
covenant that the premises are tenantable, but there is no implied
covenant of this character on the part of the landlord.8 2 The present
Pennsylvania stance is that the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to
leases of real property.8 3 From this precedent, it appears that the chance
of Pennsylvania adopting an implied warranty of habitability is re-
mote. Further, Pennsylvania does not hold the landlord to a duty of
repair, looks upon the lease as a conveyance and not a contract, and has
a statute which sets a minimum standard of habitability. It is sub-
mitted, however, that general equitable concepts compel the adoption
of an effective means of equalizing the present disparate bargaining
positions of the urban landlord and tenant. The number of tenants
who would benefit from this defense and the current widespread abuses
by many landlords, add the urgency needed for the judiciary to act.
Warranting leased premises is asking no more of the landlord than what
is fair under the circumstances.
The key to adopting an implied warranty of habitability defense is
to construe a modern lease of a residential dwelling as a transaction
similar in nature to a sale, and by analogy to a sale of goods, apply the
implied warranties of the Uniform Commercial Code (Code). 4 This
reasoning would view the residential lease for what it is-a contract
for services between the landlord and tenant. After the enactment of
the Uniform Sales Act, the doctrine of caveat emptor was abrogated
with respect to sales of goods. It is submitted that the same policy deci-
sions should apply to a residential lease. Common factors to a sale of
goods and a lease that support a similar warranty treatment for both
transactions include: (1) public policy considerations which dictate
that persons representing products as suitable and fit should be respon-
82. Smith v. M.P.W. Realty Co., 423 Pa. 536, 225 A.2d 227 (1967); Kearse v. Spaulding,
406 Pa. 140, 176 A.2d 450 (1962); Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429, 10 Am. R. 708 (1872). In
Kearse, the court rejected the argument that the Philadelphia Housing Code was in-
corporated as terms and conditions of a lease, and that breach of the Code gave rise
to an action in assumpsit against the landlord.
83. Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 161 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1947); Stein v. Bell Tel.
Co., 301 Pa. 107, 151 A. 690 (1930).
84. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -315. The following discussion will focus on
the implied warranty of merchantability of section 2-314. The implied warranty of fitness
for purpose in section 2-315, however, should likewise apply in the landlord-tenant situa-
tion. The tenant is relying on the skill and judgment of the landlord to provide and is
contracting not just for an apartment but for an apartment with conditions commensurate
with the amount of rent paid.
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sible for any defects, (2) the fact that one party has relied upon an-
other's skill and knowledge, (3) the fact that one party. is in a better
position to know of the quality of the product, and (4) that party can
more easily absorb the loss due to the defect.8 5
Under an implied warranty of habitability analagous to the Code's
implied warranty of merchantability, the test for determining breach
would be whether the apartment with the particular defect would pass
without objection in the trade under the lease description. 8 The land-
lord, therefore, may be responsible not only for defects rendering the
premises unfit for habitation, but also for lesser defects such as mal,
functioning appliances, minor plumbing problems, and minor repairs
to the walls, ceiling, and floor which would be objectionable in the
trade for the particular apartment. Under this flexible test of section
2-213(2)(a), a court would look to the facts of each-case to determine
if a breach has occurred. The amount of rent payments for the apart-
ment, and its characterization and condition at the beginning of the
lease period would determine if the particular defect rendered the
apartment objectionable in the trade. It may be acceptable if a $75 per
month apartment is in need of minor repairs such as painting. A $250
per month "luxury" apartment, though, should be substantially free
from any defects. In this latter type of apartment, the tenant is paying
for more than mere shelter from the elements. A portion of the rent is
allocated to luxuries such as air conditioners, garbage disposals, elec-
tric ranges, wall-to-wall carpets, and the decorative scheme of the
apartment.
An advantage to the approach of basing an implied warranty on the
Code standards is that the standard for determining breach is flexible
enough to effectively benefit all classes of tenants. A disadvantage to
this standard, is that the Code permits disclaimers.8 7
To exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability con-
tained in section 2-314, section 2-316(2) requires that the language
85. See supra note 73, at 721.
86. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(a). Initially, for this section to apply, the
landlord must be a merchant with respect to apartments of the type involved. Id. §
2-314(1). The Code defines "merchant" as "a person who deals in goods of the kind .
involved in the transaction .... Id. § 2-104(1). Since a landlord is a professional in the
business of making a profit from leasing apartments, this definition of merchant should
include all landlords.
87. Id. § 2-316. The Code also permits under section 2-719 limitations on the remedies
available when breach occurs. This section is not important in the landlord-tenant situ-
ation. Section 2-719(a) provides that the buyer's remedies may be limited to the repair
or replacement of non-conforming goods or parts. Practically, the repair or replacement
of defective conditions or appliances is exactly what a tenant wants.
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must mention merchantability, and in case of a writing must be con-
spicuous. A clause is "conspicuous" when it is so written that a rea-
sonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it.88
According to the Code, a printed heading in capitals is conspicuous.8 9
Also language in the body of a form is conspicuous if it is in larger or
other contrasting type or color. 90 The final determination of whether a
clause is conspicuous or not is for the court to decide. 91 Applying these
concepts to the landlord-tenant situation, the lease, in order to disclaim
the warranty of habitability, must contain a clause mentioning habit-
ability which clearly stands out from the body of the lease. If the Penn-
sylvania courts established an implied warranty of habitability, pre-
sumably the requirements for a valid disclaimer could be that: (1) the
disclaimer must mention habitability, and (2) it must be conspicuous.
Many landlords may be reluctant about putting a boldface clause in
the lease of a high rent apartment which states that the habitability of
the apartment is not warranted. Upon questioning by the tenant, the
landlord would have to explain that this clause means that if any ap-
pliances become inoperable or if any minor defects arise in the apart-
ment, the landlord is under no duty to repair them. At this point, a
tenant may go somewhere else to find an apartment, or ask the land-
lord to remove the clause before signing the lease.
If substantially all form leases contained a clause disclaiming the
habitability warranty and landlords refused to strike this clause, the
tenant could still attack the disclaimers on unconscionability grounds.92
In Santiage v. McElroy,93 the Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania
took judicial notice of the fact that a form lease was unconscionable,
labelling it an adhesion contract. 94 If the defense of implied warranty
of habitability were established in Pennsylvania, the courts should not
allow landlords to escape its effect simply by inserting another clause
into the lease and refusing to strike that clause. Since a tenant is in a
"take it or leave it" situation, it is submitted that his consent to a dis-
claimer in the lease is not freely consented to under these circumstances.
88. Id. § 1-201(10).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. § 2-302.
93. 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
94. An adhesion contract can be defined as a standardized agreement that is drafted
unilaterally by a dominant party and then presented to a weaker party as the only ac-
ceptable instrument. Schuchman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contract, 35 TEMP. L.Q.
125, 128 (1962).
Comments
CONCLUSION
The inequities in Pennsylvania landlord-tenant relationships can be
attributed to the following two factors: (1) the extra-judicial remedies
contained in standard form leases which are available to a landlord
upon a tenant's default in rent, and (2) the absence of any tenant de-
fenses based on the condition of the leased premises to a landlord's
claim for rent payments. Recent lower court cases such as Swarb, Gross,
and Sellers, have recognized the injustice of Pennsylvania's confession
of judgment and distraint procedures, and have established a right to
a judicial hearing before a judgment or levy can be enforced against a
tenant. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not decided
these issues, the trend is in the direction of voiding onerous provisions
in a form lease. Yet the lower court holdings indicate that the rights
of middle class tenants are being overlooked. It is conceded that relief
from harsh lease provisions is particularly urgent for low income ten-
ants. The fundamental right to a judicial hearing prior to entry of
judgment, however, should not be denied to a tenant because his an-
nual income is above a certain amount. It is suggested that Pennsyl-
vania courts should realistically find that all tenants are faced with a
"take it or leave it" situation when signing a residential lease. Because
of the adhesive nature of all residential leases, judicially made excep-
tions to the confession of judgment and distraint procedures which
benefit only low income tenants cannot be justified.
Once all tenants have a right to a judicial hearing before the land-
lord can enforce a claim for rent payments, an implied warranty of
habitability would further promote justice to residential tenants. The
defense could be established in the landlord-tenant relationship by
analogy to sales law. An implied warranty of habitability, in addition
to benefitting specific tenants, would serve a useful public policy func-
tion. A landlord would keep his units in a good state of repair, pre-
venting any minor defects from developing into major defects. The
number of dwellings which become unfit for human habitation, there-
fore, should decline.
A tenant signing a residential lease has certain reasonable expecta-
tions as to the conditions of the living quarters based on the type of
dwelling leased and the amount of rent paid. The courts, by recogniz-
ing an implied warranty of habitability defense, would be doing no
more than giving legal significance to the tenant's reasonable expecta-
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tions-a concept long familiar in contract law. The legislature has
shown a concern for the welfare of the slum tenant by enacting the
Rent Withholding Act. This act should be supplemented by an implied
warranty of habitability defense which would cover the majority of
situations in which leased premises need repair. The increasing number
of urban residential tenants and the widespread inequitable practices
compel a judicial or legislative overhaul of this area of Pennsylvania's
landlord-tenant law.
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